Abstract Farmers may choose to apply nitrogen fertilizer at a rate that exceeds the average ex post agronomically optimal rate when the yield response to nitrogen varies across growing seasons. Negative environmental consequences such as nitrous oxide (N 2 O) emissions and/or water pollution can result when all the applied nitrogen is not needed by the crop. Here we consider a nonlinear market instrument targeting farmers' nitrogen use, and by solving for the optimal nitrogen reduction using a model of expected utility of farm profits, we evaluate the induced N 2 O emission reductions that are consistent with the instrument introduced. The market instrument is nonlinear because of the expected nonlinear relationship between N 2 O and nitrogen application rates. Our simulations show that, in cases where farmers apply N at rates which exceed recommendations and the N 2 O response is likely to be non-linear, payments will induce participation in the program and will have a significant impact on both expected and actual N 2 O emissions without significantly harming expected or actual yields. Failure to consider this nonlinearity would deviate the attention away from N 2 O pollution because it would require large N reductions (and crop yields) to achieve equivalent N 2 O abatement.
1
Several studies using field level experimental data with at least three N rates applied have documented that low N 2 O emissions occur when N is applied at or below the optimal crop requirement, but that higher emissions are consistent with N rates greater than that threshold. Hoben et al. (2011) , using six rates between 0 and 225 kg N/ha, showed that N 2 O fluxes in Michigan corn are best described by an exponential function. On a seven site-years field experiment, Ma et al. (2010) found that emissions doubled when fertilizer rose from 90 to 150 kg N/ha but corn yields increased only slightly. McSwiney and Robertson (2005) showed a nonlinear response of N 2 O to N applications on continuous corn in Michigan using a ninepoint gradient between 0 and 291 kg N/ha. Izaurralde et al. (2004) in a 1999 experiment for wheat-fallow rotation at Saskatchewan, Canada, found that plots fertilized at 110 kg N/ha significantly increased the N 2 O emissions compared to those non-fertilized plots or fertilized with recommended 45 kg N/ha. At Broadbalk long-term experimental field in England, Yamulki et al. (1995) reported that N 2 O emissions increased slowly with N applications until the optimum is reached (the fertilization level that crop requires) and then emissions rise sharply and in a nonlinear fashion.
Nonlinear N 2 O response curves have also been reported using calibrated N 2 O emissions models (Maggi et al. 2008; Del Grosso et al. 2006; Grant et al. 2006; Chantigny et al. 1998; and Li et al. 1996) , thorough literature reviews of peer-reviewed studies (Snyder et al. 2009; Bouwman et al. 2002; FAO-IFA 2001) , and conceptual models of N input saturation on ecosystems (Townsend et al. 2003) .
This literature suggests that crops compete with N 2 O-producing microbes for the use of N in soil, limiting N 2 O production until crop N uptake has been satisfied. When the crop uses most of the available N in the soil, N 2 O emissions will be low. Emissions will increase rapidly once the crop's N demand is satisfied. Consequently, a nonlinear function between N 2 O emissions and N application rates seems an appropriate depiction of this relationship. The nonpoint source (NPS) nature of N 2 O emissions implies that the most effective way to address the environmental consequences is by altering the use of the input that ultimately causes the pollution (Shortle and Abler 1997; Xepapadeas 1997; and Segerson 1988) .
The main contribution of this article hinges upon the establishment of a connection between two aspects of the literature that have been, up until now, independently studied. The first one refers to the optimal fertilization decision when farmers face a market instrument targeting their N applications. The second is the quantification of N 2 O emission reductions coming from cutting N fertilizer applications. In this article we calculate, for the first time, the magnitudes of N 2 O emission reductions that are induced by a market instrument imposed on N fertilizer applications for different CO 2 prices. These prices reflect the social value assigned to climate change. The yield and nonlinear N 2 O response curves to N applications are calibrated to fieldlevel data. The importance of this study is highlighted if we note that new agreements at 2 While the majority of the previous and recent evidence points towards a nonlinear curve, there is also evidence that for irrigated corn in Colorado N 2 O response is highly linear up to 230 kg N/ha (Halvorson et al. 2009 (Halvorson et al. , 2014 , and that N 2 O emission factors decrease as N rate increases (Pelster et al. 2011) . Kim et al. (2013) in a metaanalysis of 26 published datasets found exponential or hyperbolic responses in 18 datasets, linear in 4, and no response in the rest. Furthermore, Shcherbak et al. (2014) on a global meta-analysis comprising datasets of 78 published studies performed for various crops, soil types, and countries found that the response tends to deviate little from linearity at rates below about 200 kg N/ha. The consideration of nonlinearity is crucial in at least two aspects throughout the paper. First, it helps in designing a market instrument that transmits price signals to farmers that are consistent with their contribution to climate change and that prompt them to reduce N applications. Second, it allows driving the important result that modest fertilization reductions have large impacts in actual and expected N 2 O emission reductions with minor crop yield penalties. Failure to consider this nonlinearity induces an underestimation of emission abatement and discourages the application of N 2 O policies. For example, a linear scheme that rewards all N reductions (those which produce high emissions as well as those producing low emissions) by the same rate would require large N reductions (and crop yield penalty) to achieve equivalent N 2 O abatement.
Farmer's optimization problem
Consider a farmer who maximizes expected utility of per hectare profits by choosing the optimal level of N fertilizer application rate (in kilograms per hectare). The farmer's problem is
where U(.) is a strictly increasing and concave utility function, e P is the unknown output price at harvest time, ỹ(N;θ) is the concave yield response function affected by random weather during the growing season and dependent on a set of farm-specific characteristics θ (fertilizer type, soil type, tillage, and irrigation practices), and P N is the observed price of the fertilizer input.
3,4 Expectations (E) are taken over the two random variables. Assuming, to facilitate the exposition, that U(.) is linear (i.e., risk neutrality) and that yield and output prices are independent random variables, 5 and denoting expected values with a bar, the first-order condition (FOC) is P ∂y N;θ ð Þ ∂N ¼ P N : We denote its optimal solution as N 0 . Panel (a) of Fig. 1 shows the expected N 2 O emissions associated with the optimal fertilizer application, and panel (b) shows the optimal N 0 at the intersection between the decreasing expected marginal value product curve and the constant observed marginal cost P N (point A). Now suppose that society assigns a value to the environmental damage caused by the farmer's N 2 O emissions. The damage value is a function of the N rate and is calculated as ϕ(N;θ)=0.298×(44/28)×P c ×e(N;θ), where e(N;θ) is the quantity of N 2 O emitted as a function of N and the set of farm-specific characteristics θ, P c is the exogenous market price of CO 2 , 0.298 is the GWP equivalence between tons of CO 2 and kilograms of N 2 O, and the coefficient (44/28) converts units of N 2 O-N to N 2 O units using the ratio of molecular weight of N 2 O to 3 Conditioning on θ implies that optimal N rate, the solution to problem (1), is different if θ changes, making the problem potentially firm-specific. Therefore, the model is general enough and contemplates as a special case the situation observed in practice where implementation of these type of schemes rely on protocols using a regional N 2 O-N response curve (Millar et al. 2012 (Millar et al. , 2013 and CAR 2013) . 4 Other inputs apart from N are not included in the profit function as they remain constant in the optimization problem. While some substitution between inputs is likely to occur in practice, the objective of this analysis is to focus on N optimal application decision. 5 In the next section we remove the linearity and independence assumptions and solve the expected utility problem under risk aversion and correlated random deviates of yield and prices. the atomic weight of the two N atoms in the N 2 O molecule. 6 In this regard, suppose there exists a regulatory agency that aims to incentivize farmers to reduce N fertilizer applications by, for example, distributing offsets (credits) for the carbon equivalent value of his direct and indirect N 2 O emission reductions. 7, 8 The incentive payment structure accounts for the increasing and likely nonlinear relationship between N 2 O emissions and N applications, for a given value of θ. In panel (a) of Fig. 1 , the fertilizer rate (in kg N/ha) is plotted against expected emissions (in kg N 2 O/ha/year). Based on this curve, we calculate the curve representing the market value of total damage, denoted by ϕ(N;θ), as explained above.
When farmers are paid for their emission (or application) reductions with offsets, the optimization problem becomes the following: 
where [ϕ(N 0 ;θ)−ϕ(N;θ)] is the dollar payment received by the farmer for reducing nitrogen applications from N 0 to N. Note that reductions are measured relative to N 0 , usually called the business-as-usual (BAU) or baseline rate, which is what this farmer would have applied in the absence of the incentive payment. With the mentioned per hectare payoff structure, the participating farmer receives a payment equal to zero when application equals N 0 (because these applications imply zero N 2 O emission reductions), and the payment increases nonlinearly as the farmer reduces the applications. With our assumptions of linear utility and uncorrelated yield and output prices, the FOC is P
The farmer's maximization is achieved when expected marginal value product equals marginal cost plus the value of emissions from a marginal unit of fertilizer applied, ϕ′(N;θ). The term ϕ′(.) increases the marginal cost of applying nitrogen (i.e., shifts the marginal damage curve up as shown in panel (b) of Fig. 1 ) because it represents the marginal dollar amount that the farmer forgoes for each kilogram of N that is applied. The solution, denoted as N*, is shown as point B, and the associated quantity of N 2 O emissions is shown in panel (a). Therefore, given the decreasing marginal value product, the new optimality implies a reduction in N rates and N 2 O emissions.
The marginal damage curve ϕ′(N;θ) faced by a farmer under the program can shift for two reasons: (i) a change in the price of carbon, and (ii) a change in the emission function e(N;θ) due to changes in θ for a given N application. In the first case, a higher price of carbon implies a higher opportunity cost of applying fertilizer, because the fertilizer application reductions are more valuable, so we should expect greater reductions in fertilizer applications (and emissions). In the second case, a different θ (such as fertilizer type, soil type, tillage, and irrigation practices) shifts ϕ′(N;θ), but also changes the marginal value product due to a shift in the production function y(N;θ). Therefore, as the two intersecting curves are shifting, we cannot unambiguously say the direction of the fertilizer applications and N 2 O emissions change.
9 As a consequence of this, we condition on the farm-specific parameter θ throughout the rest of the analysis.
This offset payment will induce the same N application reductions as a tax imposed on the purchases of the N input, provided the following conditions are met: (i) the tax structure, which according to panel (a) of Fig. 1 implies an increasing (progressive) tax rate, has a revenue curve (as a function of the N rate) that is equal to the total value damage curve ϕ(N;θ); and, (ii) the tax rate has to adjust to the annual changes in the market price of carbon. A proof is available in Online Resources 1. However, the distributive or welfare effects of each policy are clearly different.
Outline of the model
The offset structure takes into account two important factors. First, the input decision is made under uncertainty coming from both the stochastic production function and output prices.
Second, the market value of N 2 O emissions as a function of N fertilizer application rates ϕ(N) and its first derivative ϕ′(N) are nondecreasing and nonlinear.
Emission reductions are measured relative to a BAU rate that we calculate as follows: at the beginning of the planting season a farmer maximizes expected utility of per hectare profits by choosing the optimal nitrogen application rate, N.
10 This solves the following problem
where e π 0 ¼ e Pe y−P N N is the farmer's random profit, randomness coming from uncertain output prices e P and uncertain yields ỹ. Yields behave according to a conditional density function f(y|N) whose support is the non-negative closed interval [a,b] , with a and b representing the minimum and maximum yield possible, respectively. Output prices are governed by a probability density function h(P) where Pϵ[0,∞]. Expectations (E) are taken with respect to both random variables, and U(.) is a concave twice continuously differentiable utility function.
The solution is the farm-specific BAU rate which we denote by N 0 and is a function of P N and the set of parameters of the distributions f(y|N;θ) and h(P). Conditions for a maximum hold as second derivative evaluated at N 0 is negative.
When the farmer faces the offset payment, the expected utility problem becomes
where
12 Therefore, the farmer maximizes a standard expected utility problem, but incorporating the mentioned payoff structure. The FOC are
∂N dydP ¼ 0 whose solution, denoted by N*, is a function of N 0 and P N , the set of parameters of the function ϕ(N;θ), and the distributions f(y|N;θ) and h(P). Conditions for a maximum hold as second derivative evaluated at N* is negative. With N*, we are able to analyze the consequences of introducing this nonlinear offset payment on the tradeoff between N rates and yields, and on the farmer's profitability.
The implementation of this program requires the farmer to report verified nitrogen application records and knowledge by the regulator of certain field characteristics (those included in parameter θ) to determine the baseline (N 0 ) and actual (N*) application rates, and the payment function. Verification and monitoring are a challenge not new to NPS pollution in agriculture. While beyond the scope of this study, several initiatives are in place. For example, the Verified Carbon Standard and the American Carbon Registry established N 2 O reductions protocols for 10 In the previous section, for exposition, we assumed a farmer who maximizes under a linear utility. In what follows, we assume a utility that can accommodate different degrees of risk aversion. However results are very similar for different risk aversion levels. 11 Conditioning parameters of f(y|N;θ) and ϕ(N;θ) are omitted in the rest of the paper to save notation. 12 Similarly, to save notation we omit the conditioning parameter θ in ϕ(N;θ).
North-Central U.S.
13 (MSU-EPRI 2010; Millar et al. 2012 Millar et al. , 2013 CAR 2013) . The State of Alberta in Canada, runs a voluntary nitrate reduction program (Government of Alberta 2010; CFI 2011). The European Union, (DEFRA 2008; Van Grinsven et al. 2012) 14 has implemented a nitrate directive that involves monitoring farm level applications of both livestock manure and nitrogen fertilizers. This program is based on audited records of nitrogen applications as well as on soil tests. These existing programs are, in general, complemented by Best Management Practices (IPNI 2011).
Regarding farm-level costs, we anticipate additional costs associated with maintaining records, as soil testing is already conducted and therefore not implying an incremental cost (see Online Resources 2 for more details). As for possible funding sources the currently USDA funds a $900 million conservation stewardship program that uses monetary incentives of the type described here.
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The simulation exercise
We assume that a farmer owns one hectare of land, plants it on a continuous corn rotation, and evaluates the decision to participate in the offset program to reduce N 2 O emissions. The farmer solves the expected utility model described above. There exists an environmental regulatory agency that oversees the offset program and distributes carbon credits for N 2 O emission reductions, reductions measured relative to the farm-specific BAU nitrogen rate N 0 .
N 2 O emissions and the N application rate
We employ the nonlinear exponential emissions curve in place in protocols for emission reductions quantification (Hoben et al. 2011; Assuming there exists an exogenous market price for CO 2 (P c ), that is, GHG emissions are negatively valued by society, this emissions curve is used by the regulatory agency to construct the offset payment structure that rewards N reductions by the market value of their environmental damage. This value is ϕ N ð Þ ¼ 0:298 Â 44 28
À Á Â P c Â e N ð Þ, expressed in dollars per hectare. This nonlinear payment structure should give more efficient results because if the objective is to reward emissions reductions, a Bflat^payoff to all application rates as suggested by IPCC-Tier 1 or a per unit nitrogen tax will not capture the implicit emissions behavior and thus will not provide correct signals to farmers. 17 We compare both schemes in the results section. It has to be noted that for a given N rate, different weather conditions will generate different levels of emissions. However, when determining the marginal payment structure, the regulator uses emissions at average weather conditions allowing the farmer to optimize under a known payment structure. 18 The optimization under an uncertain incentive scheme is treated by Segerson (1988) .
Estimation of a conditional yield distribution
The yield response to nitrogen was estimated as a beta distribution with shape parameters p and q specified as a function of N application rates (see details in Online Resources 3). The beta distribution correctly describes the non-symmetric historical behavior of yields with respect to factors that are unobserved at the beginning of the planting season (such as weather or pests). To estimate the production function we used 600 observations collected from fieldplot experiments on continuous corn conducted between 1987 and 1991 on four different farms located in widely dispersed locations across Iowa. 19 Yields were updated to 2010 levels using a proportional yield adjustment based on Iowa corn yield growth. 20 For any given N application rate, we can draw yield random deviates coming from a Beta probability distribution function.
Simulation of correlated yields and price draws
The optimization problem is to maximize expected utility of profits, where uncertainty comes from both random yields and random output prices. Random corn prices were generated assuming a lognormal distribution (see details in Online Resource 3). Given that the percentage change of daily commodity prices can be approximated by a normal distribution, the variable in levels (the commodity price) is lognormally distributed (Hull 2009, p. 271) . We remove the independence assumption between corn prices and yields of the previous section by generating correlated draws from these two distributions (Johnson and Tenenbein 1981) . 
Maximization of expected utility of profits
First, we solve the case where emissions are not valued by society (i.e., the BAU case with solution denoted as N 0 ). To this end, we generate R=1000 random draws of correlated yields and corn prices and use a line-search algorithm to find a value of N that maximizes the expression: 18 The rationale of this assumption is that if we average a farmer's emission reductions over several years, they will be consistent with the incentive payment received in each year. 19 Conclusions are conditional on the representativeness of this dataset of Iowa agronomic and weather conditions. 20 Nitrogen application rates were not updated because average Iowa N rates remained relatively the same in the period (only 6 % increase) and do not have a clear pattern of behavior, as compared to the 51 % increase of yields around a linear trend. 21 We selected two levels of correlation; one negative based on historical observed correlation between corn yields and prices, and one positive for sensitivity analysis purposes. Negative correlation would exist because when corn prices increase, farmers have the incentive to plant more corn, substituting land away from other uses. If that new corn land is of lower productivity, we can expect a yield decrease. However, positive correlation might occur if higher prices induce changes in management practices with the objective of obtaining higher yields (using high-yielding seeds, higher seed density, different type of fertilizers and/or herbicides).
where y r and P r are the rth draw of yield and corn prices, respectively; P N is a known price of nitrogen; and U(.) is assumed to be a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function of the form U e π ð Þ ¼ −e −raπ , where ra ¼ − U ″ U 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The risk aversion coefficient was set as a value consistent with a risk premium equal to 0, 25, and 50 % of the standard deviation of profits (Babcock et al. 1993; Babcock and Hennessy 1996; Hennessy et al. 1997) . 22 As this percentage increases, the individual is willing to pay more money to avoid the risk, implying a more risk-averse agent.
We then solve the problem when emissions are negatively valued. The farmer takes as given the level of N 0 , P N , and the payoff structure ϕ(.), and maximizes the expected utility of profits conditional on R correlated draws of yields and corn prices. Then, the expression to be maximized by the farmer is
We again use a line-search algorithm to find the maximum and denote the solution as N*. With N 0 and N*, we can find the nitrogen application reduction, and also the payment the farmer receives from the program.
4 Simulation results for nitrogen application rate Table 1 presents results of the expected utility optimal application rate induced by participating in the offset program (N*), the BAU nitrogen application rate (N 0 ), the reduction of N applied, the yield loss for applying less N, the incentive payment received by the farmer, and the change in the farmer's profits due to participation. We use carbon prices of $15, $30, and $45 per ton of CO 2 e, and various risk-aversion coefficients and price-yield corrections.
23,24
With a carbon price of $30/ton of CO 2 e, a participating farmer whose absolute risk-aversion coefficient is consistent with a risk premium equal to 25 % of the standard deviation of profits optimally reduces his nitrogen applications by 9.30 kg/ha for participating in the program and obtains an incentive payment of $3.07 per hectare. The increase in profits is $1.59 per hectare because lower fertilizer costs are offset by a yield reduction. Yield penalty is less than 0.5 % while the incentive program induces N rate reductions of 4 % and expected N 2 O emission 22 The risk premium (RP) is the dollar amount an individual is willing to pay to avoid a risky bet and receive a certain profit. For our utility function, the risk premium is found to be RP ¼ E e π ð Þ þ 1 ra log E e −raπ h i . 23 Throughout the estimation we assumed a nitrogen price of $722/ton N, equivalent to $0.44/lb N suggested by Iowa State University Extension Services for continuous corn (Duffy 2014) . A higher price of N fertilizer relative to corn price induces the participating farmer to optimally make larger N application reductions because the savings from the N not applied are relatively bigger. 24 Emissions trading systems with various degrees of development, linkages between them, and a wide range of carbon prices are active in EU, Switzerland, United States (California and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative involving nine Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states), Canada (Alberta and Québec), Kazakhstan, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and pilots in six regions of China. As of March 2014 this range goes from 4.0 to 12.4 $/ton of CO 2 and as high as 168 $/ton of CO 2 if carbon taxes are considered (World Bank 2014).
reductions of more than 6 %. This result is within the range of payments computed by the mentioned protocols that while not of a large amount, when coupled with other payments due to BMP pursued, are expected to induce farmers to adopt.
Per ha N rate reduction obviously depends on farmers' starting points or BAU N 0 rate. It is worth mentioning that the obtained N 0 as an optimal solution from the model is within the recommended interval of N rates from Extension Services; 25 therefore in the real world, N reductions and payments could be larger for those farmers choosing N rates on the far-right end of the interval.
Because results are driven by the estimation of the nonlinear response curve of N 2 O emissions to N applications, e(N) (i.e., the steeper the slope the higher the payment the farmer receives per unit of N reduced), we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses. Firstly, we use an estimated emissions curve that is approximately 2 standard deviations from Eq. (5), i.e., e(N)± 1.96σ e(N) . 26 With P c at $30, the risk premium at 25 %, and the emissions curve at the upper extreme of the interval, a farmer optimally reduces N applications by 13 kg/ha and receives a payment as high as $6.45/ha with a yield penalty of only 0.6 %; however in the lower extreme N reduction is 5 kg/ha and the incentive payment is $0.20/ha.
Secondly, we present alternative results estimating e(N) using data from more than 20 studies based on corn field experiments conducted in the northern U.S. and Canada (Rochette et al. 2008; Grant et al. 2006; Li et al. 1996; Bouwman 1996; Thornton and Valente 1996) . We estimate a cubic emissions curve by Ordinary Least Squares that controls for soil type and tillage and adds a time trend (see Online Resources 5). Farmers optimally reduce N applications by 17 kg/ha (7 %) receiving an incentive payment of $11.31/ha and a yield reduction of 0.80 %. The difference with the above results hinges upon the slope of this estimated emissions curve evaluated at the optimal rate N * which is equal to 0.043 versus the 0.025 of Eq. (5). Therefore, the high dependence of results on the estimated emissions curve calls attention to and highlights the importance of research on this issue.
On the other hand, farmer's risk preferences have little influence on final results. For levels ranging from risk neutrality to high levels of risk aversion, farmer's optimal N application reductions are very similar, as shown in the second column of Table 1 . One of the reasons relies on the concept of Bapparent risk aversion^termed by Taylor (1986) . He shows that a progressive tax makes the objective function more concave making the individual seem more risk-averse. In our case, with a progressive incentive, the concavity of the objective function is in part offset by the convexity of the progressive instrument, implying an Bapparently lessr isk-averse individual.
27
Estimation results are also invariant to the production function estimated. An alternative set of results is derived using data on continuous-corn yields and N applications based on experimental plots from ISU Extension (2014). In the case of $30/ton of CO 2 e, a farmer whose absolute risk-aversion coefficient is consistent with a risk premium equal to 25 % of the standard deviation of profits, optimal reduction of N applications are 11.22 kg/ha receiving an incentive payment of $3.22/ha. Also, the yield penalty is less than 0.5 % but N applications are reduced by 5 % and expected N 2 O emissions are reduced by 6.5 %. 25 Iowa State University Extension Services using the MRTN-based Corn Nitrogen Rate Calculator recommends, for Iowa and for corn and N prices used in this analysis, N application rates between 202 and 231 kg/ha (ISU Extension 2014). 26 The standard error of the emissions curve is: σ e(N) =0.058×exp[0.01×N] . 27 We solved the model with a positive correlation (ρ =0.30), and results were very similar.
Average emissions at the BAU N rate are 1623 kg of CO 2 e ha/yr. The estimated optimal N application reduction (N 0 −N*) implies a reduction of 102 kg CO 2 e ha/yr holding weather variables at average values. 28 Because of the uncertainty on the estimated e(N) curve, emission reductions are 141 kg if the curve e(N)+1.96σ e(N) is considered and 56 kg in the case of e(N)− 1.96σ e(N) .
These levels of N 2 O emission reductions driven by the nonlinear payoff scheme are higher than those computed using the linear payoff structure with slope 0.0125 proposed by the IPCC Tier-1. In the $30 carbon price scenario, a participating farmer would reduce N applications by 4 kg N/ha (from 235 to 231), receiving a payment of about $0.58/ha. Or in order to make a comparable emission reduction of 102 kg CO 2 e (that in the nonlinear scheme is achieved by an N application reduction of 9.30 kg/ha, and a yield penalty of 0.42 %), farmers would inadvertently have to reduce applications by 22 kg/ha, inducing a yield penalty of 2 %.
To show how much the estimated emission reductions represent, consider first that an approximation of the continuous corn area in Iowa in 2013 was about 1.9 million hectares. Assuming that all Iowa continuous corn farmers participate in the incentive program, the 102 kg CO 2 e reduction implies a reduction of about 195,000 t of CO 2 e only in Iowa, or 0.48 % of the 40.8 million tons CO 2 e that are the N 2 O emissions from the application of synthetic fertilizers on U.S. cropland and grassland according to the EPA Inventory of GHG for 2009 (U.S. EPA 2011). Given that continuous corn rotation represents only about 33 % of total Iowa corn in 2013, N 2 O reductions from other rotations such as corn-soybeans, crops, states might be significant.
Conclusions
The over-application of nitrogen by corn growers, while optimal from an ex ante perspective, has negative environmental consequences. In this article, we document the N 2 O emission reductions that are consistent with a market instrument imposed on nitrogen fertilizer applications in order to induce a lower use of nutrients. GHG mitigation strategies recover importance because new agreements at expiration of the Kyoto Protocol may now involve mitigation responsibilities from sectors (such as agriculture) and countries (especially developing countries). The instrument targets the nitrogen applications because of the NPS nature of the emissions. We consider a farmer maximizing expected utility of per hectare profits and choosing the optimal nitrogen application rate. Reductions are measured relative to the farmspecific BAU nitrogen rate. We use a nonlinear payoff structure that is consistent with the nonlinear relationship between N 2 O emissions and nitrogen application rates. This instrument is far more efficient than traditional linear schemes because it transmits price signals that are aligned with the N 2 O behavior and the ultimate objective of the program.
The key insight in the article is driven by the simulation results. These show that with a modest to medium carbon price of $30 per ton of CO 2 e, a farmer reduces his nitrogen applications by about 4 % as a result of an offset payment of $3.07 per hectare. The lower nitrogen induces only a minimal expected yield penalty (less than 0.5 %) because the program targets nitrogen applications that in most years are surplus relative to crop needs. Therefore, taking into account the mentioned nonlinearity, we find that the impact on N 2 O emission reductions is significant but yields are only slightly harmed. A linear scheme aiming to achieve the same N 2 O emission reductions would inadvertently require an N application reduction of 10 % with an associated yield penalty of 2 %. Therefore, failure to consider this nonlinearity may render an N 2 O emission reduction policy unattractive. Results are robust to different levels of risk aversion which is due to the so-called Bapparent risk-aversion^.
The optimal N application reduction implies average emissions reductions of 102 kg CO 2 e/ ha/yr, or 6 % from the BAU emissions of 1623 kg CO 2 e/ha/yr.
